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ABSTRACT: One claim reiterated with increasing boldness by the “analytic” tradition in philosophy is that 
what sets it apart from long-time rivals is a shared adherence to proper norms of argumentation. Gradated 
deviancy from this (supposedly univocal) canon by English-speaking practitioners has therefore raised 
important questions about who can repair under the banner “professional philosopher.” We will portray as 
deeply worrisome the idea that argumentation should secure not just conclusions, but disciplinary 
membership as well. 
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For the sake of establishing the greater context of my discussion, I want to begin by 
quoting a well-summarized account from Michael Friedman’s book, A Parting of the 
Ways. As he writes, 
 
One of the central facts of twentieth-century intellectual life has been a fundamental divergence or 
split between the “analytic” philosophical tradition that has dominated the English-speaking world 
and the “continental” philosophical tradition that has dominated the European scene. The former 
tradition, in the eyes of many, appears to withdraw from the large spiritual problems that are the 
concern of every thinking person—the meaning of life, the nature of humanity, the character of a 
good society—in favor of an obsession with specific technical problems in the logical or linguistic 
analysis of language. Here philosophy has taken on the trappings of a scientific discipline, 
characterized by clarity of method and cooperative cumulative progress in the formulation and 
assimilation of “results,” but at the expense of all contact with the central philosophical problems 
that are of truly general concern beyond a small circle of narrow specialists. An engagement with 
the traditionally central problems of philosophy has thus been left to the continental thinkers, but 
the works of these thinkers, in the eyes of the more analytically inclined, appear to throw off all 
concern with clarity of method and cooperative cumulative progress in favor of a deliberate and 
almost wilful obscurity more characteristic of a poetic use of language than of ostensibly logical 
argumentative discourse. The divergence between the analytic and continental traditions has 
therefore been an expression within the world of professional philosophy of the much more 
general split C[harles] P[ercy] Snow famously identified between his opposing (and mutually 
uncomprehending) “two cultures”—that of the scientifically minded and that of the “literary 
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intellectuals.” (Friedman 2000, p. ix) 
 
Friedman’s characterization is irreproachable: peripheral traditions notwithstanding, there 
is indeed a great schism in philosophy. Moreover, it is entirely appropriate that Friedman 
should describe the split as involving two distinct “cultures.” Beyond their predilections 
for certain subject-matters, each philosophic side has its own history, its own classic 
texts, its own heroes, its own villains. 
Language obviously acts as an important boundary enclosing these widely 
differing cultures, insofar as the analytic tradition mainly takes root in English-speaking 
countries (leaving its continental antipode to the complementary class of non-
Anglophone countries—which, in fairness, is a fairly diverse agglomeration). But given 
that the division along linguistic boundaries is no longer as neat as it once was, perhaps 
the most relevant markers at play in the analytic/continental divide are idiomatic. 
Surveying the writings of each camp, one is struck by the pronounced disagreements on 
what is stylistically acceptable or desirable in developing an argument. To be sure, such 
norms are rarely explicitly stated. But they nevertheless form a backdrop of tacit 
assumptions that dictate ahead of inquiry proper not only what counts as an interesting 
topic, but as an interesting way of tackling it. 
 Every academic practitioner exposed to a sufficiently sustained flow of negative 
and positive reinforcement has perforce nurtured a little homunculus, a meta-cognitive 
censor that sits atop one’s shoulder and quietly suppresses this or that possible choice of 
word far in advance of any exposure to the scrutiny of one’s peers. That’s a fate common 
to all students of philosophy—some would even say that it’s why we enrol in school to 
begin with. The question, then, is whether those who converse by means of one particular 
set of guidelines are to be regarded as somehow superior. 
  
2. PROFESSIONS OF PROFESSIONALISM 
 
Given the nature of any social distinction, it goes without saying that a foreign 
intellectual culture is less desirable than one’s own; otherwise one would have joined it. 
So it is perhaps more fruitful to focus on a distinctive feature of the current schism. While 
Michael Friedman (rightly) locates the divergence “within the world of professional 
philosophy” (2000, p. ix) as a whole, many practitioners of the analytic style do not see 
the situation that way.  One claim reiterated with increasing frequency and boldness in 
both print and electronic media by analytic philosophers is that what sets their camp apart 
from long-time rivals is a shared adherence to “proper” norms of argumentation. The 
continental tradition, by extension, is seen as riddled with sophistry and deliberate 
obscurantism. 
 Now the assertion that one is a professional is far from benign. In asserting it, one 
is not merely reporting that a given state of affairs obtains; one is also engaging in a 
performative act that asserts (in the demanding sense) one’s place in the social order. 
Moreover, since the notion of profession is intimately tied with economic considerations, 
the label becomes a sign that one is entitled to practice a service that leads to 
remuneration or capital earnings of some sort. Anyone familiar with the history of the 
discipline cannot help but notice the irony that arises, then, when the adjective is 
conjoined so as to obtain the expression “professional philosopher.” For the likes of 
Socrates and Plato, the obtainment of monetary reward automatically disqualified one 
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from the ranks of true “lovers of wisdom.” Perhaps a good way to describe the current 
situation would be to say that this standard has been turned completely on its head. When 
a contemporary academic boasts that she is a “professional philosopher,” she is not 
thereby aligning her work with that of sophists who traffic principally in rhetoric. On the 
contrary, the point behind the title seems to be to put some distance between the putative 
“professional” and more disreputable claimants by erecting a wall of Realpolitik that 
segregates what are otherwise wholly disinterested pursuits (the annexed adjective and all 
it implies have not yet taken hold in the public consciousness, so it is refreshing to note 
that, for the lay person, the expression “professional philosopher” still rings as something 
of an oxymoron). 
 The means elected to secure this dismissal of foreign argumentative cultures are 
in themselves devoid of any philosophic content. Indeed, the criterion invoked—
respectable socio-economic standing—does not speak to any substantive thesis. On this 
basis alone, all one needs to do to establish one’s pedigree as a professional philosopher 
is produce evidence that one is salaried in that capacity. Yet this is arguably too lax a 
construal, as it fails to adequately capture the situation at hand. Consider the case of Ayn 
Rand. Rand, who had contact with a small group of university-trained intellectuals, 
worked outside the establishment throughout her life yet sold millions of copies of her 
philosophical works (which include non-fiction essays). But the first collection of papers 
devoted to her thought, published four years after her death (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 
1986), showed noticeable unease about incorporating such an iconoclast into the canon, 
taking to pains to state that its contributors were (presumably by contrast) “professional 
philosophers”—a fact reiterated no less than six times on the book’s back cover and 
preface. One wonders, however, whether these “professionals” will ever earn anywhere 
near what Rand did for their writing. 
 Perhaps the expression should then be taken as synonymous with “academic 
philosopher.” But given that the overwhelming majority of thinkers writing in the 
continental tradition are employed by one academic institution or another, the analytic 
proponent seeking to oust alternative ways of making a point cannot appeal to this bare 
criterion to cordon-off her rivals. So something more committal is needed than money 
and university affiliation. 
 The politics governing these ascriptions of legitimacy bubbled to the surface, for 
instance, in brusque comments made by Crispin Wright about John McDowell. 
McDowell is noted for his heavy reliance on inventive imagery as a means of 
“diagnosing” philosophic ailments, in Wittgensteinian fashion. As Sandra Dingli points 
out, McDowell’s approach “involves exposing mistaken assumptions in pictures which 
have held us captive in their grip and, once we have realized the error of our way of 
seeing things, it puts forward new pictures” (2005, p. 195). For example, in his influential 
book Mind and World (2002, pp. 24-45), McDowell contends that if we picture the 
conceptual realm as an expanse bounded by a periphery of experiential impingements, we 
will expect epistemic justification to reach beyond that fabric—thus attempting the 
impossible. This is a powerful claim. Yet notice how it is made, not by axioms, 
definitions, and syllogisms, but by means of imagery. 
 However, Crispin Wright has voiced fears that McDowell might simply be 
exhuming “barriers of jargon, convolution, and metaphor before the reader hardly less 
formidable than those characteristically erected by his German luminaries”—thus 
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fostering an obscurantism which Wright believes has been absent since “the academic 
professionalization of the subject” (2002, p. 157). In an attempt to safeguard “the care 
and rigor which we try to instill into our students” and to protect “the susceptible” from 
being wastefully carried away by the ideas of Mind and World, Wright warns that 
“McDowell is a strong swimmer, but his stroke is not to be imitated” (2002, pp. 157-
158). 
 For the record, McDowell (2002, p. 291) has been singularly unfazed by the fact 
that Wright “drums me out of the regiment of analytic philosophers” (an amused 
expression which he borrowed from Richard Rorty, “who of course often gets his 
epaulettes slashed off,” (ibid., p. 304 n. 21)). Still, to the outsider not privy to the internal 
dynamics of the discourse at hand, this sort of expulsion may seem puzzling. 
 
English-language academic philosophy is now in a post-purge period of its development, ruled 
over […] by the velvet glove of a mass of analytic philosophers committed to a view of 
philosophy that is a mere shadow of what it once was […]. This shadow was not created by a 
series of logical debates aiming at “truth,” but by a train of ideological and political struggles 




What’s at work here is the self-conscious realization that philosophizing in the analytic 
style has reached a high degree of cohesion. Early in the twentieth century, scientifically-
inclined figures like Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap (and, after them, Willard V. O. 
Quine) argued that philosophers should approach their task as a collective endeavour. 
Given the decline of British Hegelianism, that call filled an important vacuum, and 
analytic philosophers, loosely gathered around a preoccupation with the “analysis” of 
epistemological issues via language, increasingly saw themselves as the vanguard of a 
bold new methodology. In the analytic literature, one finds a sustained uniformity in the 
vocabulary employed. Scholarly papers tend to take cognizance of the work done by 
colleagues, and the scope of the contributions is usually quite humble, adding only a 
choice titbit to an impressive and ever-growing edifice of intermeshed texts. 
 As in science, there is a palpable feeling (mistaken or not) that, thanks in large 
part to analytic philosophy, the discipline is (on average) moving forward. This, in turn, 
has underwritten a further claim, namely, that sustained collective participation in the 
analytic mode has brought upon the “professionalization” of the discipline—this last trait 
being construed as a laudable one. 
 It is not surprising that this should happen in philosophy. The discipline has been 
the site of some of the most distinctive developments in the twentieth century’s 
theoretical understanding of intellectual activity. Nowhere has this been more obvious 
than in the highly influential work of Thomas Kuhn. His Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962), though severely selective in its historiography, nevertheless made 
sense of much scientific practice whilst pretty much disregarding the orthodox 
assumption that what bestows upon the endeavour a special status is its correspondence 
with a stable worldly domain. Coupled with anti-foundationalist critiques emerging 
independently within philosophy (I am here thinking mainly of Quine’s holistic view and 
W. Sellars’ critique of “the Given”), this led to a heightened awareness of the role that 
kinship plays in ensuring the cohesion and distinctness of academic disciplines. What 
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ensued what an unprecedented disciplinary self-consciousness. 
 Yet it is instructive to ask: to which philosophic tradition does Kuhn’s 
contribution belong? Interestingly, his views seem to have enjoyed a double-citizenship. 
In the hands of continental philosophers who see their central goal as emancipatory, the 
idea of a self-governing community ensuring the continuation and integrity of its 
disciplinary “paradigm” became a powerful tool of critique—a way to unveil the 
discursive mechanisms by which (bourgeois) power reproduces itself (Kuhn took 
exception to the use of his work by the New Left and social scientists generally, see his 
2002, pp. 307-308). The appropriation of Kuhnian ideas in the analytic world was less 
enthusiastic, and took an altogether different turn. The relativistic implications nested in 
the controversial notion of incommensurability met with considerable resistance. Still, the 
core insights were hard to dismiss: dogmatism and wilful intellectual closure can actually 
improve the overall institutional strength of a discipline. 
 So in spite of vocal denunciations, I believe this important Kuhnian idea was 
secretly admired. For in the hands of analytic philosophers who see their central goal as 
the piecemeal clarification of linguistic confusions, the general framework can vindicate 
a certain self-assertiveness. No longer should such philosophical technicians apologize 
for the remoteness of their craft. Indeed, between short-lived episodes of turmoil are 
lengthy periods where the status quo reigns supreme and rival proposals are debarred 
outright, before they get an actual hearing. While Kuhn’s work can and has been used to 
serve the cause of radical social critique, it also harbours a marked conservatism (a 
feature which Steve Fuller (2003) has done much to bring into focus). It is in this light 
that the recent talk of “professionalism” in analytic philosophy should be viewed. 
 Several institutional organs bear witness to this disciplinary self-consciousness. 
Topping the list in this regard is the so-called “Philosophical Gourmet” report, a biannual 
listing which ranks universities solely on the basis of whatever name recognition their 
faculty generates. Here the quest for academic prestige unfolds unabashedly. Only 
Anglophone institutions are included, the website stating in no uncertain terms that 
“‘analytic’ philosophy is now largely coextensional with good philosophy and 
scholarship” (www.philosophicalgourmet.com/2004/meaningof.htm). That statement 
obviously does not reflect the judgement of continental thinkers (for a sobering glimpse 
at what analytic philosophy looks like when viewed from the “other” side, see Boundas 
2007). But when the appraisers are the appraised, it is no surprise that the resultant 
assessment is laudatory. 
 
4. US AND THEM 
 
In contrast with Wright, I think a philosopher like McDowell should be commended for 
taking the risks he does. While it may irk some to recognize it, metaphors are to theories 
what cults are to religions: precursors waiting to be sanctified by greater adoption. It 
takes a significant lack of hindsight not to recognize that today’s accepted theories were 
once fledgling intuitions, and a matching lack of foresight not to recognize that today’s 
tentative pictures may perhaps enjoy a likewise good fortune in the future. Although 
Wright obviously feels more at home in the last hundred years or so of Anglo-American 
philosophical discourse, one cannot help but wonder whether someone like Francis 
Herbert Bradley (was he a professional?) warned his students to be weary of the 
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disruptive idiom of a Bertrand Russell. In any event, Wright’s paternalistic comments 
vis-à-vis McDowell’s approach rest on a romanticized delusion: as we shall see shortly, 
barriers of jargon already exist, and what Wright is really bemoaning is a perceived 
changing of the guard. 
 Deplorably, instances abound of analytic philosophers tersely dismissing 
alternative argument cultures. Consider the Philosophical Dictionary written by McGill 
professor Mario Bunge (2003). Breaking with the usual format, this work is very 
polemical, and is peppered with highly personal commentaries ranging over sundry 
topics. Let’s look at the entry for a staple of continental philosophy, Heidegger’s notion 
of Dasein: 
 
DASEIN  Being-there. The trademark of existentialism. In some texts, Dasein = Real existence. In 
others, Dasein = Human existence. In still other others Dasein = Consciousness. The hermeneutic 
difficulty is compounded by the recurrent phrase “das Sein des Daseins,” i.e., the being of being-
there. Related terms not yet used by existentialists: Hiersein (Being-here), Dortsein (Being-over-
there), Irgendwosein (Being-somewhere), and Nirgendwosein (Being-nowhere). Along with such 
spatial categories we may introduce their chronological counterparts: Jetztsein (Being-now), 
Dannsein (Being-then), Irgendwannsein (Being-sometime), and Niemalssein (Being-never). On 
the other hand, Ursein (primordial-Being), Frühsein (Being-early), Frühersein (Being-earlier), 
Spätsein (Being-late), and Wiedersein (Being-again) have no spatial partners. (This asymmetry 
may suggest an interesting indictment of Einstein’s special relativity theory.) [...] Note how 
natural these combinations sound in German, and how clumsy their English counterparts sound. 
Which proves that German (when suitably macerated) is the ideal language for existentialism. A 
number of deep metaphysical questions involving these concepts can be framed. For example, 
‘Was ist der Sinn des Dawannseienden?’ (What is the sense of Being-there-whenness?) ‘Was ist 
das Sein des Nirgendniemalsseins?’ (What is the being of Being-never-nowhereness?) ‘Are you 
there-then Hans?’ And ‘What will Grete find there-later?’ A systematic exploration of this vast 
family of expressions might lead to a considerable extension of existentialism [...]. (Bunge 2003, 
pp. 65-66) 
 
Serious considerations to the side, this passage is admittedly funny. Still, it is telling. First 
and foremost, it is significant that the move was regarded as permissible or appropriate, 
and that the target was deemed sufficiently discredited so as to not attract any 
consequential opprobrium. It is not merely that Dasein was not regarded worthy of an 
entry in a dictionary of philosophy (here not qualified as analytic but hegemonically 
announced as “philosophy” tout court). Rather, the notion was pulled from the recycling 
bin and displayed as a comical counterpoint—ostensibly to exemplify by way of contrast 
what a “good” analytic notion looks like. 
 It is unfortunate that mister Bunge did not make the effort to comprehend what is 
at stake in Dasein. He is perspicacious enough to observe that it is applied equally to 
“Real existence,” “Human existence,” and “Consciousness,” then hastily glosses this 
polysemy as a weakness. But that, as it happens, is the whole point, lying right there 
before his eyes: Real existence is Human existence and Consciousness cannot be 
divorced therefrom. Much current cognitive science, with its emphasis on embodiment 
and situated cognition, is slowly bearing this out. In fact, the title of Andy Clark’s 
influential book, Being There (1998), is a nod to Dasein. 
 This deplorable lack of appreciation notwithstanding, Bunge’s dismissive pot-shot 
was aimed at an established target. In a classic paper on “The Elimination of Metaphysics 
through Logical Analysis of Language” published in 1932, Rudolph Carnap singled out 
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choice excerpts from Heidegger and subjected them to criticism, showing how, for 
example, the author uses certain words as both a substantive and a verb (a major offence 
for Carnap). So choosing to belittle the notion of Dasein is not at all a risky move; in fact, 
it is arguably more a rite of passage amongst analytic philosophers—even though Gilbert 
Ryle recalls that in the early days when such practices were being canonized “most of us 
had never seen a copy of Sein und Zeit” (Ryle 1960, p. 10). Interestingly, early-on in his 
career, Carnap had enthusiastically studied Being and Time, attending a Switzerland 
conference where Heidegger was debating and even astonishing his Vienna Circle 
colleagues with his ability to interpret Heidegger’s difficult work (see Friedman 2000, p. 
8). The split with the continent, however, has since been fully consummated. 
 
5. NOT MUCH DIFFERENCE 
 
Following in the footsteps of Carnap, Mario Bunge is clearly bothered by the prospect of 
adopting methodologies that lead to vacuous exercises in wordplay. Although he makes 
his point obliquely, Bunge obviously thinks continental schools have foundered into 
precisely such verbiage. When he writes that “A systematic exploration of this vast 
family of expressions might lead to a considerable extension of existentialism” (Bunge 
2003, p. 66), the growth alluded to is an intellectually and philosophically malignant one. 
Gratuitously combining arbitrary notions and then exploring the myriad interrelations that 
ensue is thus a perversion of proper methodology that should be avoided. Accordingly, 
whatever library shelves might be filled by means of such a misguided matrix can be 
dismissed offhand, without meticulous study. 
 Fair enough. After all, I have elsewhere pushed for a “hermeneutic impatient with 
hermeneutics” and advocated principled epistemological intolerance with “linkages that 
extend on the sole basis of speculation” (Champagne 2007, pp. 242, 201). But Bunge’s 
chosen example, existentialism, is held to be representative, and the underlying claim 
being advanced is that this sort of otiose expansion is endemic of the continental 
tradition. That’s no doubt a comforting idea for an analytic philosopher to entertain, yet is 
it really so? Again, the truth of the matter lies right before the author’s eyes but, owing to 
partisanships, goes unseen. 
 Consider the following, fictitious, entry. Take a word—any word (the more banal 
the better). Then add to it the suffix -ism. It is then no longer a word, but a position 
(should the stance carve out a topical space no one really occupies, this need cause no 
worry: the -ism can yield anonymous -ists defined as those who would uphold the 
relevant tenet(s)). To illustrate, let’s pick the word “juxtaposition.” Once this is done, a 
declension along the following lines can readily be obtained (again, the following is not a 
real entry, although it could just as easily be): 
 
JUXTAPOSITIONISM  A stance in the philosophy of such-and-such. We may distinguish 
between two forms of juxtapositionism. Weak juxtapositionism can be contrasted with strong 
juxtapositionism. The weak juxtapositionist differs from the strong juxtapositionist in that she 
does not endorse the further thesis that the stance should glossed in realist terms. The strong 
juxtapositionist is more ontologically committed, holding that the juxtaposition under 
consideration entails not only instrumental, but real, consequences, and thus betokens a true state 
of affairs. Weak juxtapositionists usually argue that the strong variant overdoes the basic 
commitments of the stance, as all that is required by juxtapositionism per se is the bare presence of 
the juxtaposition. The supplementary additions, on this reading, are not warranted. Recent debate 
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has focused on whether this last criticism is tenable, that is, whether weak juxtapositionism is 
itself internally consistent. Arguments in favour of the internal inconsistency of weak 
juxtapositionism are twofold. First, there has been an increasing sense that the very project of 
juxtapositionism is fundamentally flawed, being premised on a dogmatic dichotomy between 
juxtaposed and juxtaposing (So-and-so is a major proponent of this revised, non-dogmatic, view). 
Second, a more moderate re-evaluation of the position has sought to retain the basic features of 
weak juxtapositionism while incorporating some of the realist commitments of strong 
juxtapositionism. There thus emerges a more sophisticated mixed juxtapositionism, the 
programmatic outlines of which have been articulated in the works of So-and-so and So-and-so 
(although So-and-so has refused to identify herself as a mixed juxtapositionist). The chief 
desideratum of the mixed view is to buttress itself against the accusation of dogmatism while 
retaining the basic distinction. Although there is as yet no consensus on whether mixed 
juxtapositionism is itself immune to the more traditional criticisms levelled at the weaker stance it 
seeks to supersede, the proposal itself has yielded a fruitful juxtaposition-theoretic template 
whence future developments can unfold. A systematic exploration of this vast uncharted field 
might lead to a considerable extension of juxtapositionism generally. 
 
The analytic tradition is replete with verbiage like this, gratuitously combining notions 
and then exhaustively exploring the myriad interrelations that ensue. What’s the 
difference between this example and the previous one about Dasein? Well, according to 




So what’s a philosopher to do: pick a side and deride the opposing party’s way of putting 
a point across, or rise above the fray? Partisanship is unattractive, and neutrality is 
perhaps unattainable. Still, it would be disheartening if the late-twentieth century Parisian 
intelligentsia which analytic philosophy so abhors was correct in its cynical insistence 
that when we venture into such meta-philosophical questions the only tenable realization 
we can come to is that, in the end, might makes right. 
 
[B]ureaucratic institutions, as any student of Max Weber knows, tend to fight for their territories 
tooth and nail, rarely agreeing to cede administrative province to a rival without some sort of 
concrete political and economic pressure. Added to this is the fact that most current academic 
philosophers who run philosophy departments do not want these lost provinces back anyway, 
taking pride in their splendid isolation from engaged philosophy. (Mann 2008, p. 675) 
 
That’s a fair description of the current situation. Is full regime collapse needed (as the 
quote’s author suggests at the close of his article, ibid.)? Some have argued that this is 
already under way, only analytic philosophers don’t know it yet. The historian John 
Deely, for example, believes that “the philosophical establishment within the academy 
has become to philosophy’s future what the judges of Galileo were to the future of 
science,” and surmises that “That is how the story of philosophy will appear when our 
successors look back on the twentieth century” (2001, p. viii). 
 For reasons I shall not develop here, I would tend to agree. That prediction 
notwithstanding, I’ll gladly leave the “professionalism” talk to other disciplines, and 
allow philosophy—traditionally, “the love of wisdom”—to call into question established 
modes of argumentation or try new ones without any fear of reprimand. If not us, who? 
Surely there’s a little place in the university setting for those who put the pursuit of truth 
ahead of the quest for professional respectability. If not, then perhaps it is time to 
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relocate. 
 Notable exceptions notwithstanding, I am not fond of the continental tradition; 
neither its aims nor its methods. Still, I am often ashamed to see those who share in this 
sentiment mistakenly see it as a license to indulge in dogmatic closure. Not only does the 
inference not follow, the false sense of superiority it provides is patently unbecoming. 
But one of the problems is that thinkers who work in English and are conversant with 
both analytic and continental writings but pledge allegiance to neither are currently 
displaced persons in academia: we don’t even have a name. 
 Of course, the label “philosopher” used to suffice. But it seems the genus now 
calls for a differentia, a prefix that will further refine group membership. There is cause 
to worry about this trend, for as Karl Popper rightly stated fifty years ago, “There is no 
method peculiar to philosophy” (1959, preface). Anybody who thinks otherwise is simply 
deluded—the victim of a methodological short-sightedness brought on by prolonged 
intellectual commerce solely with like-minded people. A pluralism of method, however, 
doesn’t mean there is no truth of the matter or that anything goes, any more than the 
acknowledgement that one can get to Rome several ways means there are several Romes. 
Much the opposite: to the extent a discipline bears upon something other than itself and 
isn’t held together merely by inter-textual nepotism, the grasp of its object can be 
articulated independently in any idiom, such that policing dissidents becomes not a sign 
of maturity but a reflexive confession of vacuity. 
 To be sure, this admonition applies equally well to the continental tradition. But 
given the issue discussed, namely the questionable idea that the specific culture of 
argumentation fostered in analytic circles somehow has a greater claim to 
“professionalism,” it is perhaps appropriate to apply Popper’s motto and close with a 
quote from John McDowell, which I wholly endorse: “If analytic philosophy prohibits 
imagery except for rare special effect, and precludes letting the full import of a term [...] 
emerge gradually in the course of using it, as opposed to setting down a definition at the 
start, I do not care if I am not an analytic philosopher” (2002, p. 291). 
  




Boundas, C.V. (2007). How to recognize analytic philosophy. In: C.V. Boundas (Ed.), Columbia 
Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies (pp. 29-35), New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Bunge, M. (2003). Philosophical Dictionary. Amherst: Prometheus. 
Carnap, R. (1932). Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache. Erkenntnis 2, 219-
241. 
Champagne, M. (2007). Atomism, Wholism, and the Search for a Tenable Third Way. (Doctoral 
dissertation, Université du Québec à Montréal). http://www.archipel.uqam.ca/1147/01/D1690.pdf 
Clark, A. (1998). Being There: Putting brain, body, and the world together again. Cambridge/London: 
MIT Press. 
Deely, J.N. (2001). Four Ages of Understanding. Toronto/London/Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 
Den Uyl, D. and D.B. Rasmussen (eds.) (1986). The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand. Urbana/Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Dingli, S.M. (2005). On Thinking and the World: John McDowell’s mind and world. Burlington: Ashgate. 
Friedman, M. (2000). A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago/LaSalle: Open 
Court. 




Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Kuhn, T.S. (2002). The Road since Structure: Philosophical essays, 1970-1993, with an autobiographical 
interview. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Mann, D. (2008). The rump parliament of modern academic philosophy. Dialogue 47, 663-676. 
McDowell, J.H. (2002). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
McDowell, J.H. (2002). Responses. In: N.S. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell: On Mind and World (pp. 
269-305), London: Routledge. 
Popper, K.R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London/New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Ryle, G. (1960). Autobiographical. In: O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle: A collection of critical 
essays (pp. 1-15), New York: Anchor. 
Wright, C. (2002). Human Nature. In: N.S. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell: On Mind and World (pp. 140-
159), London: Routledge. 
